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
1. INTRODUCTION 
The paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” by A. 
Turing was first published in 1950. It was quite a long time 
ago. A lot of people may still remember the age when we had 
no computers. But it is crucial to look at the past because when 
we recall the past we see that it serves the present. Today it 
gives us fresh insights on what we sometimes overlook and 
draws our attention to ideas that might have been skipped for 
some reason. It also can give us some new perspectives to look 
from and that is why we look back there for new ideas. 
However, the history of the idea of a human-like creature, 
endowed with artificial intelligence, is coming from much 
older times than science-fiction fans believe, attributing the 
idea of robots to Karl Czapek who coined this term in the 
twenties of the last century. The legend about a man-made 
creature capable of everything that a man can do comes from 
extreme antiquity. We read about it in the works of Chuang 
Tzu, a Taoist from Ancient China, in the ancient Greek myths 
about Pygmalion, and "smart" tripods-assistants of 
Hephaestus. Aristotle seriously considered the "automation" of 
reasoning and described syllogisms - logical premises and 
conclusions that serve as elementary building blocks of 
rational thinking. Another important milestone on this path 
was the work by Gottfried Leibniz, who at the end of the 17th 
century not only laid the foundations of mathematical logic, 
but also talked a lot about the possibilities of algorithmic 
thinking. 
At the end of the XVII century, Leibniz described the concept 
of ratiocinator - a logical system that allows us to express any 
derivative concepts clearly and simply, using basic elementary 
concepts and strict rules, and performing operations on them 
that resemble mathematical ones. The idea of creating such a 
"philosophical machine" was grand, but due to the 
underdevelopment of technology, it remained unrealized for 
many years. The first significant step towards this was taken 
only in the 1830s when Charles Babbage tried to construct an 
"analytical engine", a mechanical prototype of modern 
programmable computers. The outcome was not very 
successful but the attempts to "mechanize" thinking has not 
stopped. 
In the 1930s, Kurt Gödel formulated and then proved 
incompleteness theorems, according to which no system of 
formal arithmetic can be complete and internally consistent at 
the same time. In other words, there is no such system that 
allows one to prove or disprove any given statement. This had 
puzzled many researchers for a while. But soon Alan Turing 
and Alonzo Church introduced the concept of computable 
function (solved in one system or another) and showed that all 
functions can be solved not through formulas but 
algorithmically, for example, using a Turing machine (Turing, 
1936). Turing’s thesis, in its simplest form, says that a 
universal Turing machine can perform any computation that a 
human can do (Turing, 1937). This idea, surprising in its 
simplicity and depth, paved the way for the emergence of the 
first computers, on which Turing himself worked during the 
Second World War. At that time the British scientist thought 
of creating an "intelligent machine" (intelligent machine). The 
term "artificial intelligence" was not yet coined. 
A lot of effort is being put by various institutions at the 
national level into building Artificial General Intelligence. 
Notably, in Russia Sberbank, a leading Russian technology 
corporation, has launched a large-scale AGI research program, 
attracting the world’s top talent like J. Schmidhuber (Efimov 
et al, 2021). The authors of this paper are working on the 
philosophy and methodology of the AGI research program and 
 
 
     
 
want to share their views on it. Particularly, we have jointly 
developed some novel approaches to cognitive architecture for 
the future AGI. It might be useful to facilitate some fruitful 
outcomes of combining the Narrow AI approach and a more 
general one. 
In recent years, the actual issues of AI development have been 
widely discussed at high-level conferences like Artificial 
General Intelligence (Goertzel et al, 2019), Robophilosophy 
(Coeckelbergh et al, 2018) and some others. Notably, the 
issues raised by Turing 70 years ago provoked some 
discussions at an important conference “Beyond Turing” 
(Marcus et al, 2015). It was organized by G. Marcus and 
attended by such researchers of artificial intelligence and 
robotics as B. Lenat, K. Forbus, S. Scheiber, T. Podgio, E. 
Meires, S. Adams, G. Banavar, M. Campbell, C. Ortiz, L. 
Zhitnik, A. Agraval, S. Antol, M. Mitchell, H. Kitano, V. 
Jarrold, G. Marcus, O. Etzioni and others. Many papers in that 
conference were dedicated to novel ways of testing robotics 
and artificial intelligence, as well as some substantiated 
proposals were made on the use of embodied intelligence to 
create AGI models. Many of these researchers are simply 
trying to transfer the Turing test methodology by using a robot 
instead of an abstract computing machine that simulates a 
human conversation. For example, one of the original ideas 
from the "Beyond Turing" conference was that of using AI as 
an independent factor in scientific discoveries. Today, H. 
Kitano, the head of the AI program at Sony Corporation, 
believes that the Turing test can no longer be a criterion for 
creating artificial intelligence and that at the existing level of 
technology it is possible to develop an “AI system that can 
make major scientific discoveries in biomedical sciences, and 
that is worthy of a Nobel Prize” (Kitano, 2016). 
Additionally, it is necessary to note some individual works and 
works done by groups of researchers, such as W. Nöth (Nöth, 
2001), A. Clark (Clark, 2001), H. Ishiguro (Ishiguro, 2007), S. 
Penny (Penny, 2018) et al.  
Overall, there are three approaches to a long-term research 
program in AGI: connectionism, logical representation and 
embodied intelligence. The authors of this paper take side with 
the last one, and it is strongly supported in the works of R. 
Brooks (Brooks, 2018), Clark (Clark, 2020) and many others, 
who maintain there is a connection between the cognitive 
functions of intelligence (both of human and a machine) and 
physicality, and are convinced that the classical view of 
machine functionalism on the role of representations in 
cognition is “too cerebral” (Spitzer, 2016). Clark gives an 
example of a study where the behaviour of female crickets was 
analyzed and one of its findings was that male crickets used a 
unique sound source localization system. Clark argues that this 
process is carried out completely without any internal 
representations of the surrounding world, relying entirely on 
the mechanical solution of the problem by the female cricket. 
Similar mechanisms are used by people to solve everyday 
problems (Clark, 2001). 
Some researchers are bridging robotics and AGI fields with 
biology and semiotics by making attempts to implement the 
idea of umwelt for robotics. For example, a robot perceiving 
the world solely via the radio waves that are emitted and 
absorbed by radars cannot understand the “red” colour. Thus, 
a robot might have a kind of a limited umwelt similar to the 
umwelt of an insect. Few authors agree with this, discussing 
the issues of umwelt for robots and the semiotic meaning of 
perception and artificial intelligence (Nöth, 2001). However, 
their discussion is limited only to the application of robotics to 
the physical world. 
A very thorough discussion on the issues of virtual humans, AI 
and embodiment can be found in Burden et al (Burden, Savin-
Baden, 2019). 
AGI as well as robotics are developing very rapidly, and a lot 
of definitions are improving very rapidly. For the definitions, 
in search of a clearer understanding of the issues of modern 
robotics, including intelligent robotics and the use of AI in 
robotics, one can address Murphy’s handbook (Murphy, 
2019). 
2. CHESS AND CIPHERS 
Many experts today believe that before embarking on the 
creation of artificial intelligence, one should figure out the 
nature and structure of the natural. However, Turing saw the 
problem in a completely different way. He inherited the ideas 
of Rene Descartes, who considered the living organisms as 
fully automated beings, believing that a fully-fledged 
consciousness and thinking are only characteristic of humans. 
In such a world view, the human mind, his intellect is separated 
from the real world, as a part of a different “sphere of 
consciousness”. Likewise, in the thought of Alan Turing, the 
intellect practically did not specifically depend on its physical 
carrier. 
In his famous 1950 paper “Computing Machinery and 
Intelligence,” he identified several areas representing the 
"highest manifestations" of human intelligence that should be 
modelled in the future (Turing, 1950). They are the study of 
languages (and translations), games (chess, etc.), mathematics, 
and cryptography (including solving riddles). If in these fields 
of activity, a computer cannot be distinguished from a human, 
- claimed Turing, - then we should consider their thinking as 
equivalent, and we can say that we are dealing with an 
“intelligent machine.”  
Turing didn't think that the most prominent thing in a person 
was the ability to play chess, conduct sublime dialogues or 
solve cryptographic riddles. Turing was convinced that to 
create intelligent machines with abilities comparable to 
humans, it was not enough just to teach the machine to interact 
with the physical world. In a 1948 report to the National 
Physics Laboratory, Turing wrote that such a machine “would 
not be able to appreciate such things so important to humans 
as food, sports, or sex” (Turing, 1948). Creating a machine 
capable of interacting with the real world means to follow the 
path of a more guaranteed artificial intelligence, while Turing 
considered this path to be longer and more expensive than 
teaching a computer to play chess. 
It should be mentioned that a couple of years after this 
publication there appeared a "turtle" by Walter Gray – one of 
the first autonomous robots. Surprisingly, the very primitive 
creatures displayed "intelligent" behaviour and could, for 
 
 
     
 
example, find their charging station using a phototaxis and 
guided by the light. This complexity was born as an outcome 
of direct interaction of the real world with the simplest 
"consciousness" of robots, and if Turing had written his article 
later, he would certainly have formulated the problem 
differently. Although this article was written more than 70 
years ago, it set the conceptual foundations for many 
generations of researchers into artificial intelligence 
(Ackerman, 2014). According to Turing's approach, high-level 
brain intelligence functions can be reproduced in an artificial 
system without imitating the system in the physical world. And 
the test, described in his article, developed such 
representations. 
3. INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE WALL 
Reflecting on the test, Turing started from the Victorian 
“imitation game.” According to its rules, a presenter, 
exchanging notes with the players, must determine who of the 
players is a woman and who is pretending to be one by 
exchanging notes with them. Of course, a "referee" does not 
see them at the same time. He is separated from the players by 
a wall, impenetrable to everything except for symbolic 
information, such as notes or, in modern terms, chat messages. 
This test can be seen as an “intelligence test” for a man who 
has to imitate "feminine" (of course, in representations of 
Victorian times) behaviour and reactions. The Turing test 
transferred this situation to a game with a computer that must 
simulate a living person hidden from the judge by the same 
"wall.” 
This wall seems to be an indispensable element of the test 
because without it we will immediately see whom we are 
dealing with. It hides the physical reality of the conversation 
partner and reduces his entire thinking down to a certain 
limited set of processes. At the same time, even Turing himself 
admitted that a comprehensive human knowledge of the world 
is impossible without direct interaction with this world. 
However, at that time, imitating tasks such as doing sports, 
eating food, or having sex seemed completely unthinkable, so 
the British scientist postponed them to the indefinitely distant 
future and suggested focusing on games, languages, and 
cryptography. As a result, Turing launched a kind of race 
between a man and a machine exclusively in the virtual space. 
At the same time, the idea of such a test stimulated the 
development of the systems that performed certain narrow 
functions better than humans, whether it was playing chess, 
translating, or driving a car, and that was even ready to replace 
us in one area or another. The narrow capabilities of the 
intellectual machine were originally laid down in the 
paradigmatic idea of Turing, which limited the intellect only 
to simple verbal, symbolic communications and ignored all 
other modalities. Can the intelligence that plays chess, chats, 
and solves riddles be called a general AI? It is hardly 
possible... 
However, if a machine (a robot or a computer) remains 
separated from the person and the world by a wall, it is unable 
to fully interact with them, and the machine's true intelligence 
is replaced with the complexity of the functions it implements. 
That is probably enough for an unmanned vehicle or a chess 
program, but it is not enough in the pursuit of general AI which 
calls for a paradigm shift. It means that we must “break the 
wall” and take a step towards a novel post-Turing 
methodology. The methodology requires that all the elements 
of the “test” mentioned by Turing should constitute a single 
whole and be seen as a complex: the observing judge, the 
subject (a person or a computer), and the questioning tool (the 
wall turns into a rich interactive environment, a sort of 
interface between a machine and a person). 
4. VERIFICATION BY DATING A GIRL 
For an easier explanation of post-Turing methodology, we 
shall refer to the thought experiment “verification by dating a 
girl” proposed by Alexeev (Alexeev, 2013). Let us say a young 
man meets a couple at an online dating platform. Having 
chosen the appropriate parameters (age, lifestyle, etc.), he 
receives a list of users and initiates a conversation with one of 
them. After a long virtual conversation, the young man finally 
invites the girl out for a date only to discover that he has been 
chatting to a program all this time. This rather embarrassing 
discovery is equivalent to artificial intelligence successfully 
passing the Turing test in its classic version. Expecting 
technological evolution to follow its current way, Alexeev 
suggested that “shortly, the ‘Dating Girl’ scenario will also 
come true” (Alexeev, 2013). 
However, even if this scenario is implemented, it will not make 
any practical sense because it deprives the machine of the 
comprehensive direct and useful interaction with a man and 
the world when interacting “through the Turing wall.” To 
clarify this, let’s imagine a different ending to the scenario in 
the same experiment. Suppose that the young man meets the 
girl in a cafe and she looks alive and real. However, the offline 
conversation does not go so well: it turns out that they do not 
have so much in common. The young man discovers that the 
witty and appropriate remarks that the girl was giving when 
chatting online were automatically prompted by artificial 
intelligence. Disappointed, the young man goes back home 
and writes to her that he is embarrassed by such a meeting and 
feels a little uncomfortable, but she replies with a quote from 
his favourite TV series, and the interaction is resumed. 
Thus, the wall separating interactions between a human and a 
machine does not bring any value to AGI development. The 
wall is excessive and is no longer needed to assess the degree 
of artificial intelligence and its interaction with people. At the 
same time, a computer turns out to be emotionally closer and 
more understandable than even a human conversation partner, 
it is “more humane than a human himself.” In this regard, one 
can again recall Plato with his “eternal ideas” and real objects 
as their manifestations. Artificial intelligence, not encumbered 
by the Turing wall, can embody the “idea of intelligence” in 
the same way as a person himself does, in its own right and 
through interaction with a human. A person knows who he is 
dealing with and realizes that he feels better with a machine: 
he finds it more interesting, more useful and more reliable. 
5.  POST-TURING 
A real thinking machine should become the product of 
versatile interactions with humans and the outside world: 
verbal and non-verbal, taking place both in a virtual 
 
 
     
 
environment and in a real one. Therefore, the classical Turing 
test covers only the areas of verbal and virtual interaction, like 
Winograd's schemes and most other popular tests of artificial 
intelligence. This is not surprising, because they all exist 
within the paradigm set by Turing, i.e. "behind the wall.” 
Breaking it down means getting out into the field of non-verbal 
and real assimilation of the world by artificial intelligence. 
Today we realize that many animals possess certain forms of 
consciousness, including even cephalopods. And each time 
thinking and its manifestations turn out to be related to the real 
conditions in which the living creature exists, to the 
corporeality of the living creature and its motor skills. 
According to Dubrovsky (Dubrovsky, 2019), mental 
phenomena has occurred only in those organisms that are 
active in the external environment. It seems that a complete 
knowledge of the surrounding world is essentially impossible 
without physically interacting with it. Therefore, a condition 
for creating the "general" artificial intelligence will be its 
capability to work in different modalities and different 
environments. It needs a gateway to non-verbal and physical 
fields. 
 
The idea of all kinds of robots (or any machines) interacting in 
verbal-nonverbal and physical-virtual areas is graphically 
represented in (Fig.1). Two axes are making up altogether four 
dimensions from a robot’s (or a machine’s) perspective: 1) 
verbal\virtual world; 2) verbal\physical world; 3) non-verbal 
\virtual world; 4) non-verbal\physical world. These four 
dimensions (further referred to as “techno-umwelts”) cover all 
possible interactions for all kinds of machines, which is why 
they are so important and call for a further detailed discussion. 
5.1 Verbal Interaction\Virtual World 
The history of AI research described in the work shows why 
the majority of tests (thought experiments) built before 2008 
are in this quadrant. Testing various skills of verbal 
communication is the basis of the canonical Turing test, Lady 
Lovelace test, Colby test, Searle test, Block test. In all these 
tests a person acts virtually in the world of his imagination and 
in the world of a computer program. The interface consists of 
a standard: display, a keyboard and a mouse. An example of a 
similar interaction may be a user interaction with a banking 
program. Casual connections in already existing systems of 
concepts are the basics of a machine's responses, even if a 
computer can assess the social motives of the 
conversation/interaction partner. 
5.2 Verbal Interaction\Physical World 
There are very few examples of Turing tests in this quadrant 
as it is very hard to come up with them because we don’t have 
real human-level robotics or artificial general intelligence 
combined in one universal machine. Essentially, a real robot 
with a fully-fledged AGI should be tested here, if one is 
intending to pass any Turing test at all. There are no known 
successful examples of robots capable of communicating with 
humans and interacting with the physical world at the same 
time. R. Brooks (Brooks, 2018) notes that it might take ages 
before robots get to this quadrant by becoming capable of 
operating at the level of an 8-year-old child. S. Harnad 
suggested that his Total Turing test will be placed in this 
quadrant. 
5.3 Non-verbal Interaction\Virtual World 
An example of such interaction is the duel between game 
characters in computer games. Although A. Turing pointed out 
its importance, this area of tests was long ignored by 
researchers. Recognition of images, human speech, as well as 
their synthesis, can be an example of non-verbal interaction in 
the virtual world. Influence by the physical world is 
fundamentally absent, and even if a machine recognizes the 
speech of a person (for example, that of a player) it then 
determines only the words and ignores their meaning. Actions 
or emotions of virtual avatars, which carry a heavy semantic 
load without transmitting any verbal information whatsoever, 
can be an example of non-verbal interaction in the virtual 
environment (Efimov, 2020). 
5.4 Non-verbal Interaction\Physical World 
Put extremely simply, this quadrant is an automatic barrier that 
must be lifted when a computer recognizes a person's face by 
using a camera. Everything becomes much more complicated 
when it is necessary to imitate the actions of a person, or a 
robot must move freely around an apartment or a hospital 
corridor, send parcels to people and receive objects from them. 
The virtual space created by people has quantifiable, 
programmable characteristics, and is very limited in terms of 
its varieties. Contrasted with it, the reality is inexhaustible. In 
the physical world, the role of chance increases sharply, and 
abstraction becomes a separate task (Richert et al, 2018). This 
quadrant of Turing-like tests is the most challenging because 
the action in it is directly dependant on the combination of 
Figure 1. Shows the Turing continuum (Efimov, 2020). 
 
 
     
 
powerful artificial intelligence and advanced robotics. 
Researchers have simply been ignoring this area since the 40s 
of the last century, and A. Turing himself set an example. In 
the meantime, its significance for communication between 
people is self-evident (for example, gestures) and is 
emphasized by all researchers of communication. One of the 
potential tests for this level of robotics development implies 
the necessity to compare an android and a person: the machine 
pronounces only the phrases of a person that were previously 
recorded, but with the maximum resemblance to the person 
(Ishiguro, 2007). 
Also, to determine the intellectual abilities of a machine, one 
can use the Brooks test (Brooks, 2018) or the E. LENA test, 
which are based on non-verbal interaction. The Brooks test, 
probably the hardest to implement in this context, engages all 
four areas/quadrants of the Turing-like tests. 
Examples of artificial intelligence that cope with non-verbal 
tasks include already existing systems capable of playing 
computer games, or a virtual TV presenter Elena (created at 
the Sberbank Robotics Laboratory, she can fully imitate a real 
TV presenter, her movements, emotions, and gestures). 
However, both systems do not go beyond the limits of the 
virtual world. Real interaction with humans in the physical 
world is still an extremely difficult task. This is not enough for 
a general artificial intelligence to come true, as such a machine 
must cover all four areas of interactions and environments 
(Efimov, 2020). 
6. THE ADVENT OF “TECHNO-UMWELTS” 
Back in the 19th century, the eminent biologist Jakob Johann 
von Uexküll noticed that different living creatures had 
perceptual worlds that were different from those of other 
species, and peculiar to their one. He called them “umwelts.” 
By analogy, we propose to call the four areas of a possible 
machine interaction - “techno-umwelts.” Techno-Umwelt is a 
domain of world perception, the way a machine sees the world 
around it. Everyone knows what the personal umwelt is, and 
many have seen the "techno-umwelt" of unmanned vehicles 
using radars and lidars in videos (Efimov, 2020). 
It seems acceptable to draw a parallel between the post-Turing 
architecture of an intelligent robot with biological evolution, 
where an environment (an umwelt) played a key role in the 
adaptation of biological species. Let us try to compare one of 
the techno-umwelts to the area where life appeared on Earth – 
the World Ocean. In this case, the emergence of intelligent 
robots from the first techno-umwelt can give them new, 
adaptive features, just as the “blind watchmaker” of evolution 
has been giving new opportunities for millions of years to 
living creatures that would come onto land from the ocean. A 
transition to the next techno-umwelt for robots could mean an 
upgrade to the next range of features. The point is not that a 
robot that must autonomously move on land suddenly learns 
how to swim autonomously. The point is that the capabilities 
of a robot that has been successful in one of the techno-
umwelts should be gradually transferred, like skills, to another 
techno-umwelt. At the same time, in the evolutionary cycle of 
the development of intelligent, embodied robots, the role of a 
human creator is increasing, who can endow robots with 
additional technical capabilities, while observing the course of 
their evolution. 
The above profile of human-machine interactions (verbal-non-
verbal and virtual-physical) give four independent “techno-
umwelts”: verbal virtual, non-verbal virtual, verbal, and non-
verbal physical. The versatility of Artificial General 
Intelligence (AGI) is only possible when a machine is capable 
of shifting freely between all four “techno-umwelts.” The 
current generation of AI is capable of recognizing objects of 
different classes without prior training. This is the most 
important achievement, but it has nothing to do with the 
capability of working in different “techno-umwelts.” To 
achieve the latter, it will be required to implement a kind of 
"translators" from the language inherent to one perceptual 
world to the language of another. Only then will artificial 
intelligence be able to become truly multimodal, be able to 
solve a whole range of potential tasks, and establish a fully-
fledged “communication” with a person. 
There are many ideas for AGI implementation, like virtual 
personal assistants, solving different kinds of puzzles or 
playing board games, and so on. However, none of them are 
going to be representative of true AGI, as they are limited to 
just one techno-umwelt, thus rendering their experience from 
a particular techno-umwelt useless for another one. For 
example, do not ask an AGI-enabled virtual personal e-mail 
manager to control a self-driving car. It has no capabilities. 
However, almost every adult human can drive a car and answer 
emails (better do not do both at the same time). Humans have 
an innate ability to act in different environments: we are better 
than machines in the physical world, but we are struggling to 
compete with machines in the virtual world, as it is not 
something inherent to us. 
7. CONCLUSIONS: NEW COGNITIVE 
ARCHITECTURES 
The post-Turing approach to AGI methodology allows us to 
design novel architectures for cognitive systems. For example, 
instead of separated, silo-like intelligent machines, working in 
a sense-think-act paradigm in various environments, we could 
build architectures universal for all techno-umwelts. Of 
course, we need a low-level integration to fuse robot's skills 
acquired in various techno-umwelts. Techno codes, translating 
experiences from one techno-umwelt into another to be used 
by a robot or a machine, might be a basis for such integration. 
It resembles the case when the same machine can drive as well 
as answer emails for its owner. 
To summarize, the authors have proposed two things. Firstly, 
we need to join together the subject, the object, and the 
observation tool in one unified testbed. Thus, the Turing test 
will be transformed into a post-Turing one. There is no need 
for a wall separating the subject and the object – this will only 
make things worse, creating competition between humans and 
machines. Future AGI tests should seek better performance of 
robots and humans working without any "walls", be open to all 




     
 
Secondly, we need to focus our efforts on designing and 
building machines capable of operating autonomously in 
various techno-umwelts rather than just manipulating in one at 
a time. The same robot (or AGI) should be able to 
autonomously answer questions and drive a car. A 
specialization profile is for insects and old machines, but not 
for humans or AGI-enabled robots of the future. 
The emergence of AGI will forever change our interactions 
with technology. After millennia of philosophical reflection 
and scientific and technological progress, for the first time in 
history, people will encounter some truly "smart" things, the 
devices that can possess even more comprehensive and 
accurate knowledge about the world and us than we do. This 
situation requires a fresh look at what a person and his mind 
are to reconsider many well-established concepts. These 
processes have already begun today, and we are beginning to 
"dissolve" in the technologies and gadgets that surround us 
from everywhere. The very notion of "man" is being blurred. 
As computers master new areas of activity, be it chess or 
translation, these areas can no longer be considered an 
exclusive prerogative of a person. Perhaps being a person is 
something that a machine is not yet capable of imitating. 
However, human engineers can create a machine that can 
autonomously get from point A to point B, but one has to be a 
philosopher to see the place where the point B is situated.  
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